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Presumably the basic goals of Japan are peace and prosperity with its neighbors - and with the rest of the world. However, the present Japanese foreign policy, tied as it is to a very aggressive US foreign policy (70 interventions since 1945 only, with 12-26 million killed under almost any president) is steering Japan towards increasing tension, and possibly even a war with such major neighbors as PR of China and DPR of Korea (with South Korea in a squeeze). Japan may easily end up fighting wars of the US empire for regime change. Moreover, the tie to a US economy in basic disorder, with the dollar heading downwards, and decreasing acquisitive power in the bottom half of the world and of the US population may also be against the interests of Japan. While in no way advocating any dramatic break with the West in general and the USA in particular, the argument is to open fully a second window, relating Japan more closely to East Asia as a major foreign partner. The argument is also to draw lessons from another country, democratic Germany, and not only from the USA. In the summer of 1945 Japan and Germany shared a position of total defeat and humiliation. Not only were the armies defeated, and almost all major cities destroyed, with citizens burned alive or evaporated by nuclear bombs by Anglo-America. Their projects, a Neuordnung headed by Nazi Germany for Europe and possibly beyond, and a dai-to-a kyoeiken, a Great East Asian Coprosperity Sphere headed by militarist Japan for large parts of Asia/Pacific and possibly beyond, were also in ruins. The defeat was not only military but also spiritual. Their projects to shape history were gone forever, beyond retrieval. New projects were needed. Germany and Japan had also shared the experience of electoral democracy and the rule of law, and of seeing it overturned by a coup and an authoritarian ideology in he early 1930s. This is important, and serves to underline how different they both were from today's Iraq with no democracy to restore, far from beaten militarily with guerrilla fighting being very problematic for the Anglo-American invaders. And with Iraq's pan-Kurdish, pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic projects as intact as ever. Not only militarily, but also spiritually beaten, Japan and Germany offered no resistance against the occupation after the military defeat. To the contrary, being accustomed to submission to an unquestioned authority they both accepted the victor as that new authority, opting for the US part of the Anglo-American alliance, the Anglo part looking unhealthy and in the process of losing rather than building an empire. Both countries, people as well as leadership, wanted a new start and accepted in an unquestioning manner the projects imposed on them, electoral democracy with a market-dominated economy. There were even basic similarities between the two parties in power most of the time, the LDP in Japan and the CDU in Germany (both names being misnomers). Both of them were, understandably, upset about the division of their countries after the war. And both joined US-dominated security systems, NATO for Germany and AMPO for Japan, CIA for both, accepting the theory of the Soviet Union as a major threat. But after some time their foreign policies started diverging. Germany developed four policies without parallels in Japan. This is not unrelated to the fact that the German opposition party SPD was in position for some major periods, but there has also been a broad consensus except for No. 4. These four policies, having been tested in reality, are proposed here as alternatives for Japan. First, Germany, having invaded and occupied about 25 countries and committed genocide against 3 peoples, the Jews, the Cinta-Roma and the Slavs (particularly the Russians), has today reasonable relations to all 28. The key was reconciliation. And the key to reconciliation was not only apology and compensation, but above all letting truth speak through new textbooks, hiding nothing, conveying to victim nations and future generations of Germans the horrors of Nazism with a German vow of Never Again. Second, strongly related to the first point, Germany became a pillar in the European Community construction, from 1992 the European Union. Starting with the Coal and Steel Community of 9 May 1950, continuing with the Treaty of Rome that went into force on 1 January 1958, Germany successfully co-created a community with five neighboring countries--Be-Ne-Lux, France and Italy-- with which Germany had had problematic relations, to say the least. Third, strongly related to the second point, Germany more and more projected itself internationally through the EC, later the EU, avoiding accusations of revival of German expansionism. Foreign policies had to pass a filter very sensitive to German domination. The filter is not perfect, however, as there may be a tendency to permit expansion in an old area (like the Balkans) on the condition that Germany supports others member states when they also expand into their old arenas (like Spain in Latin America, France in Africa, England all over.) But by and large it has worked. Fourth, strongly related to the preceding points: Germany remained a friend of the USA. However, like any good friend, Germany said No when the friend went astray and attacked Iraq to get resources, markets, political control, military bases and cultural footholds, using pretexts like weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism. We do not know the future of the EU. There could be an aggressive superpower in the making, waiting to take over when the USA abdicates. Such problems should be confronted at an early stage. But, leaving that aside, a Four Points alternative Japanese foreign policy emerges readily from the German story: [1] Reconciliation with countries once occupied, particularly China (People's Republic, and Republic), Korea (Democratic People's Republic, and Republic) using textbook revision, with contrition, apologies and compensation for crimes committed. [2] Construction of an East Asian Community, EAC, possibly beyond China/Taiwan and the Koreas, with some overlap with ASEAN. Okinawa, with more autonomy, and with major US bases removed, could be a dynamic center, like Brussels for the EC/EU, and Geneva for the UN. North Korea may not yet be ready but will eventually join, and negotiations should aim at that option like EEC/EC negotiations once provided for East Germany. [3] Channeling major economic, political, cultural and also security policies through an East Asian Community would root Japan where it belongs, in East Asia, and liberate Japan from the two degrading and dangerous roles as a US satellite, and at the same time a curtailed Asia/Pacific hegemon. [4] EAC membership does not exclude with good relations with USA and the West, and with occasionally saying No, publicly (not only behind closed doors), eg., when USA pursues expansion, provokes North Korea unnecessarily, or encircles China. A policy of this type is highly compatible with the goals of good neighbor relations as Japanese trade is moving in this direction anyhow. And, in an EAC context the five islands disputes in the Southwest Pacific could also be solved, possibly as EAC condominia, with a formula for the sharing of proceeds. Needless to say, both the USA and Russia could be linked to the EAC as observers. Okinawa could be solved, and so could the Northern Territories problem, by combining a transfer to Japan and a time-limited condominium with Russia, with a similar generosity from Japan, restoring the largest island to the Ainus. Peace all over. A policy of this type demands a recasting of Japanese foreign policy from expertise in submission (to the US) and domination (in Asia/Pacific and Africa) and low level neighbor interaction (China and North Korea) to expertise in egalitarian relations in all directions. The UN focus would be less on a dominant Security Council position and more on active, egalitarian participation in the work for prosperity and good relations to neighbors and the rest of the world for all. Like many others Japan would participate more with good ideas and examples of equality and equity than with threats and bribes, through display of force and checkbook diplomacy. This will not be easy as it is contrary to some Japanese traditions. Possibly Japanese NGOs, largely staffed by women and youth, will have to continue showing the way. In this there is much to build on. A9 should be kept and moves should be made to restore Japan to its original intent, compatible with a defensive defense of the archipelago. Any deployment of forces outside Japan should only happen if in agreement with a UN Security Council mandate. Any effort to develop the EAC into a superpower should be actively resisted. If AMPO is to be kept those obligations should clearly come second to the UN Charter. It should be emphasized what this would mean for Japan: opening an additional window to the East while not closing the window to the West; two windows being better than one. Learning from Germany is nothing new in Japanese history. Even details in Meiji nation-building were imitations of Bismarck and Wilhelminian Germany. Militarist Japan, however, was probably more an Oriental development parallel to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy than imitations - belonging, as they all did, to the same cohort of recent nation-states (the 1861-71 cohort). Anyhow, better learn from a very democratic, highly anti-Nazi Germany. And from the history of the creation of a Western European Community, today stretching as a union far into the rest of Europe, with an admirable record of peacebuilding among the members. Learning from a success is not a bad idea. Maybe the first steps in that process are very well known and yet it is not the path traveled by Japan the last 60 years. A glance at geography should persuade most Japanese that Japan is not an archipelago off California but off the East Asian mainland; in fact very close. A glance at history should persuade most Japanese that the relations with their neighbors Korea and China have been by and large very peaceful, that the major aggressor has been Japan, whereas relations with the USA have been problematic with phases of enthusiastic imitation, competition, tension and then a catastrophe; the Pacific War, and today USA and Japan sinking together between China-India and the European Union. A glance at social structure should persuade most Japanese that there is an unfortunate attraction to verticality, and if Japan cannot boss other then it can submit to the victor, boss some Pacific islands and turn its back to its neighbors. Time has come to learn from geography and history and apply those lessons to concrete peace politics. To practice equality and equity will be difficult. But such is the grammar of peace.
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